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CLD-213        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1060 
___________ 
 
JAMES MCINTOSH, a/k/a Karim Bey 
 
v. 
 
J. T. SHARTLE 
 
James McIntosh,  
                                  Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 12-cv-02240) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jerome B. Simandle 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 25, 2013 
 
Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 10, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
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 In March 1998, James McIntosh was sentenced as a career offender to 322 months 
in prison after being convicted of robbery and a firearm charge.  We affirmed his 
conviction on appeal but remanded for resentencing.  McIntosh was again sentenced to 
322 months as a career offender and appealed.  We affirmed his sentence.  In 2004, 
McIntosh filed an unsuccessful motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  Most recently, 
McIntosh filed a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  The District Court granted the 
Appellee’s motion to dismiss the § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction, and McIntosh 
filed a timely notice of appeal. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary review over 
the District Court’s legal conclusions.  Cradle v. United States, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d 
Cir. 2002).  In his § 2241 petition, McIntosh argued that he was actually innocent of 
being a career offender.  He contended that under Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 
(2008), his state court conviction for simple assault did not qualify as a predicate offense 
for career offender status, as it was not a crime of violence.   
  Under the explicit terms of § 2255, a § 2241 petition cannot be entertained by a 
court unless a § 2255 motion would be “inadequate or ineffective.”  Cradle, 290 F.3d at 
538.  We have explained:    
A § 2255 motion is inadequate or ineffective only where the petitioner 
demonstrates that some limitation of scope or procedure would prevent a 
§ 2255 proceeding from affording him a full hearing and adjudication of his 
wrongful detention claim.  It is the inefficacy of the remedy, not the 
personal inability to use it, that is determinative.  Section 2255 is not 
inadequate or ineffective merely because the sentencing court does not 
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grant relief, the one-year statute of limitations has expired, or the petitioner 
is unable to meet the stringent gatekeeping requirements of the amended 
§ 2255.  
   
Id. at 538-39 (citations omitted).  McIntosh has not shown that a § 2255 motion would be 
inadequate or ineffective.  He argues that our decision in In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245 
(3d Cir. 1997), allows him to proceed via § 2241 because he did not have an earlier 
opportunity to raise this claim.  In Dorsainvil, we held that a defendant may proceed via 
§ 2241 when a subsequent statutory interpretation renders the defendant’s conduct no 
longer criminal.  Id. at 251.  Here, McIntosh is challenging his designation as a career 
offender.  Thus, he does not fall within the exception created in Dorsainvil and may not 
proceed under § 2241.  See Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120–21 (3d Cir. 
2002) (holding that a petitioner is barred from proceeding under § 2241 because his 
argument was based on sentencing and did not render the crime he was convicted of not 
criminal). 
 Moreover, even if McIntosh were able to raise this claim via a § 2241 petition, it 
would be without merit.  As noted by the District Court, we have already determined that 
McIntosh’s 1984 simple assault conviction qualifies as a crime of violence.  In 2009, 
McIntosh filed a motion to recall the mandate in his direct criminal appeal.  See United 
States v. McIntosh, C.A. No. 99-1678.  We denied the motion because McIntosh had 
pleaded guilty to “intentionally, knowingly and recklessly causing bodily injury to 
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others.”  Thus, his simple assault conviction involved purposeful conduct and was still a 
crime of violence.  See United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 203, 212 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 For the above reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
  
